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SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE
(A PRELIMINARY STUDY ON CHINA’S PERCEPTION ON INDONESIA)

Ardina Kartikasari
Department of International Relations
Universitas Indonesia
ardina.kartikasari@gmail.com
Abstrak
Tulisan ini membahas mengenai citra Indonesia di mata Cina dalam isu sengketa Laut Cina
Selatan (LCS). Sejak pertama kali Cina merilis klaim nine dash line pada tahun 1993 hingga
insiden di perairan Natuna pada tahun 2016, Cina berperilaku ambigu terhadap Indonesia, di
mana Cina bersikeras menyebut kedua negara memiliki tumpang tindih kepentingan di perairan
Natuna. Namun di sisi lain Cina selalu berhati-hati dalam merespon Indonesia terkait sengketa
ini dan menyatakan mengakui kedaulatan Indonesia atas kepulauan Natuna. Terkait hal ini,
meski sudah banyak penelitian mengenai kebijakan Cina terhadap Indonesia, namun hanya
sedikit kajian yang menulis secara spesifik mengenai persepsi Cina terhadap Indonesia dalam
sengketa LCS. Dengan menggunakan pendekatan teori image, tulisan ini berusaha mencari
tahu tentang bagaimana citra Indonesia di mata Cina, yang kemudian membentuk persepsi
Cina atas Indonesia dalam isu sengketa LCS. Argumen utama dalam tulisan ini yaitu image
atau stereotip yang ditangkap Cina dari Indonesia, adalah ally image, dimana Indonesia
dipandang sebagai aktor yang dapat bekerja sama, serta memiliki kapabilitas dan dimensi
kultural yang setara.
Kata kunci:
Laut Cina Selatan, Indonesia, Natuna, Teori Image
Abstract
This paper discusses the image of Indonesia in the eyes of China on the South China Sea (SCS)
dispute. China circulated the map of Nine-dotted lines in 1993 and since then China has
behaved ambiguously toward Indonesia as the dotted lines encompasses some part of
Indonesia’s North Natuna waters. China insists two countries have overlapping interests over
some of Indonesia’s Natuna Exclusive Economic Zone which China claims as it traditional
fishing ground. China, however recognizes Indonesia’s sovereignty over the Natuna Islands and
has been cautious when dealing with Indonesia on the Natuna issue. This behavior continues
until the last three incidents occurred in Natuna waters in 2016. Although there are many
studies on the South China Sea dispute and China’s policy toward Indonesia, few if any of them
discuss specifically on China’s perspective toward Indonesia. Adopting image theory as an
analytical framework, this paper figures Indonesia’s image on the eyes of China, which then
shaped China’s perception toward Indonesia on SCS dispute. The main argument in this paper
is China captures Indonesia’s image as an ally image. In this image, Indonesia is seen as an
actor who can work together, has similar capabilities and cultural dimensions with China.
Keyword:
South China Sea, Indonesia, Natuna, Image theory

176

Global Jurnal Politik Internasional 21(2)

INTRODUCTION
The water around Natuna, located in the southwestern part of Kalimantan, has often
become a hotspot in Indonesia-China relations. In 2016, tension between the two
countries heightened due to three incidents which involved Indonesia’s authority with
China-flagged fishing vessels (Kusumadewi, 2016). All three incidents were perpetrated
by violations of border and illegal fishing by Chinese fishing vessels in the water around
Natuna, which China’s claim of nine-dash line encapsulates.
Nine-dash line was first revealed to the Indonesian officials in 1993, when
‘Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea’ was commenced.
For Indonesia, Chinese claim on nine-dash line did not affect its sovereignty over any of
its islands, but it does violate its maritime sovereignty (Lumbanrau and Kusumadewi,
2016). Ali Alatas, Indonesia’s then Foreign Minister, scrutinized the claim. Yet,
clarification on Chinese claim was only released in 1995, when China’s Foreign
Minister at that moment, Qian Qichen, stated that China did not claim any of the islands
in Natuna. A similar statement was made by Wang Yi, China’s current Foreign
Minister, to Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi on June 3, 2016 in Paris
(Agusman, 2017).
Notwithstanding its statement of not having any claim on the islands in Natuna,
Hua Chunying, the Spokesperson of Chinese Foreign Ministry, later stated in his protest
on the incidents in Natuna that both China and Indonesia had overlapping claims on
maritime rights and interests in South China Sea. The letter contained China’s first
statement on both countries’ overlapping interest in the water of Natuna (Sinaga, 2017).
The letter represented China’s changing claim, in which China’s initial claim did not
problematized Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) around Natuna’s water.
In addition, the incidents in Natuna Sea, which had inflicted escalating tensions
in both countries’ relations, also represented the dynamic character of Indonesia-China
relations, specifically China’s foreign policy on Indonesia. Although both countries
have incorporated South China Sea dispute in their bilateral relations since the release
of the 1993-version of “nine-dash line” map, I am not able to find a sufficient amount of
studies which specifically scrutinize on China’s perception on Indonesia within the
context of the dispute. Past studies on South China Sea mostly encompass a general
view of China’s behavior and perspective, but none shows a specific analysis on how
China enacts its policies on South China Sea to Indonesia. It is shown by my review of
previous literatures on China’s policies to Indonesia, which are based upon four
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perspectives: (1) foreign policy analysis; (2) security; (3) political economy; (4) public
diplomacy.
Literatures on China’s foreign policy to Indonesia can be divided into three
periodical-based categories. The first category is comprised of literatures on policies
during post-World War II, specifically after G30/S1 occurred in Indonesia, to 1967
(Mozingo, 2017; Zhou, 2015). During this period, China’s foreign policies to Indonesia
were not deemed as complete failures. Yet, both states were perceived to maintain a
rather ambivalent relationship toward each other, in which several discords between the
two were to be blamed. The second category encompasses studies during Indonesia’s
cancellation of its diplomatic relations with China (Bert, 1985; Visscher, 1993). This
period saw China’s attempt to reform itself toward an open society after Mao Zedong’s
death, which resulted to attempts to thaw its relations with Indonesia and Myanmar.
China also began to offer initiatives to normalize its diplomatic relations with Indonesia
and its willingness to wait until Indonesia was ready to accept the offer. The third period
occur after both countries normalized their relations (Daojiong, 2000; Suryadinata and
Izzudin, 2017). This period witnessed China’s public pressure on Indonesia post-May
1998 riots, in which many Indonesians of Chinese descent suffered as victims. Yet,
China was also very cautious in displaying rather contentious remarks in order to not
harm its relations with Indonesia. Such caution was portrayed in China’s responses to
Indonesia’s policies on the islands of Natuna by not making any official mention on
‘nine-dash line’ in any of its official statement regarding Indonesia.
The next group of literatures cover those viewed from the perspective of
strategic studies, which unravel several conditions affecting China’s policies and
behavior in South China Sea and, consequentially, toward ASEAN member states.
Security dilemma was perceived to push ASEAN member states to pursue hedging
strategy against China as a response to China’s rising power (Haitao, 2017), despite
China’s defense diplomacy strategy in Southeast Asia to counter influences from great
powers, most notably from the United States (Storey, 2012). However, China’s rather
assertive military strategy in South China Sea was understood to reflect China’s priority
in upholding its national interest, namely territorial sovereignty and energy security
(Ginting, 2018). Then, from the perspective of political economy, Chinese policies in
Indonesia was understood as ‘developmental realpolitics’ (Wu and Chong, 2018) and as
economic diplomacy (Safitri, 2014; Amalia, 2018). Economic instrument was also
perceived as a form of China’s soft power strategy to Indonesia. Lastly, a literature from
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the perspective of public diplomacy views China’s adoption of “panda diplomacy” as an
attempt to maintain its bilateral relations and strategic cooperation with Indonesia,
especially after incidents around the Natuna Sea (Kumalaningtyas, 2019).
The author noted that there has never been a study which specifically examines
China’s perception on Indonesia within the context of South China Sea dispute. In this
case, this research is intended to understand Indonesia’s image from China’s perspective
to understand how China perceives Indonesia, due to China’s rather ambiguous attitude
on its adamant view on Indonesia and China’s overlapping claims over the waters in
Natuna. Yet, at the same time, China was always cautious on its responses to Indonesia
with regards to the dispute and in its statement on acknowledging Indonesia’s
sovereignty on the islands of Natuna.
The significance of understanding China’s perception on Indonesia lays upon the
important role of perception and image in the process of decision-making of a specific
state. Robert Jervis argued that it is impossible to explain how decisions or policies are
made without any reference from the decision makers themselves (Jervis, 1976 in
Misik, 2013). Image of the targeted state is considered as an important factor to
decisions made by statemen. Therefore, their policy choices reflect descriptions of the
situation from the eye of the decision makers, which are not a neutral, non-opinionated
description of the situation (Misik, 2013). In this case, perception of the said actor on
what it considers as a reality only becomes real when the targeted state accepts such
perception. The perception resulted in an image which represents the actor’s
understanding of the reality. Alexander, et. al. (2005) similarly noted that image or
stereotype of a state is shaped by interstate relations and what justifies the state’s
attitude or responses toward other states.
Therefore, this study is mainly intended to understand how perception affects
state’s attitude and policies toward other states while facing territorial dispute. This
study is also conducted in order to enrich studies on South China Sea dispute, especially
those which are concerned with Indonesia. Then, this study will also contribute to
Indonesia’s foreign policy making in South China Sea.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Image theory is used to identify what would justify certain international image or
stereotype and foreign policy choices. The theory suggests that structural features play
important roles in determining certain image from the perspective of one country to
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another. Image, or stereotype, of a certain state is shaped by interstate relations with the
other state, which would further justify its attitude or reactions toward the other state
(Alexander, et. al., 2005).
Image, as a concept in international relations, was first developed during the
Cold War. Kenneth Boulding’s analysis of international system became the first study
to utilize the concept. Boulding (1959) defined ‘image’ as “… the total cognitive,
affective, and evaluative structure of the behavioral unit, or its internal view of itself and
its universe”. He (Boulding, 1959) added that "the images which are important in
international systems are those which a nation has of itself and of those other bodies in
the system which constitute its international environment”. Acceptance of enmity or
amity and acceptance of strengths and weaknesses of a certain unit is a central feature to
the impression in which certain actor is subjected to. Conceptualization of image was
also elaborated in an article on foreign policy by Richard Cottam in his book titled
Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case Study. Cottam’s (1978 in
Jervis, 1978) main object of discussion was perception based on five ideal types of
image on other actors: enemy, allied, imperial, colonial and complex.
The Cold War period witnessed a significant increase in studies utilizing ‘enemy
image’ concept to examine interactions among states. In this case, such concept was
mostly employed to comprehend the nature of U.S. – USSR relations. The concept
assumed that the targeted actor was ‘evil’ in nature and considered as powerful. ‘Enemy
image’ also labelled the targeted actor as rather egoistic, by putting forward its own
interest, and immoral. The targeted actor was also described as a “paper tiger”, meaning
that the actor carried intentions to intimidate other actors by making full use of its
power, which would consequentially mask its weak position (Alexander, et. al., 1999).
As the Cold War ended, in which the international system experienced a shifting
polarity, studies on image theory experienced a growing variety of conceptualizations.
Hermann and Fischerkeller (1995) argued that enemy image alone was no longer
eligible to be used as a framework to understand multiple perceptions and actions
among different states. Both stated that a certain state, involved in multiple conflicts
with different actors, tend to have different perceptions toward all conflicting parties.
Such tendency was showcased by U.S. policies on USSR during Cold War and against
Iraq after its attack to Kuwait in 1991. In this case, in spite of both USSR and Iraq being
perceived as enemies, the U.S. showcased different responses to such hostilities, in
which the U.S. chose to attack Iraq and not to directly attack USSR. Considering such
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instances, Hermann and Fischerkeller stated that formulating another image type was
needed to fully grasp important aspects in different strategic situations with different
alternative scenarios.
Hermann and Fischerkeller (1995) contributed to Cottam’s conceptualization of
perception by adding ‘degenerate image’ into his four types of image. Therefore, it is
fair to conclude that there are five ideal types of image which will be considered in this
study, namely: (1) enemy image; (2) degenerate image; (3) colony image; (4) ally
image; (5) imperialist image. Enemy image implies perceiving targeted state as a threat,
which is determined by its material capabilities and culture. Degenerate image is
defined as perceiving targeted state as an actor possessing possible capabilities to be
exploited. Such targeted state tends to be similar in terms of capabilities, yet less so with
regards to its culture. Then, colony image represents a perception of targeted actor as a
weak and inferior counterpart, both in terms of capabilities and culture, hence its image
as an exploitable actor. Ally image implies perceiving the targeted state as an equal
counterpart, resulting in an understanding that the targeted state is a figure with whom
the subject can cooperate with, due to their rather equal capabilities and similarities in
cultural dimension. Lastly, imperialist image views the targeted state as a stronger and
threatening counterpart. However, the targeted state is seen as less superior with regards
its culture.
Out of all the images mentioned above, there are three dimensions which would
affect subjected actor’s perception against the targeted actor. In this case, Alexander, et.
al. (2005) and Hermann and Fischerkeller (1995) utilized different terminologies.
Alexander, et. al. (2005) described the three dimensions as ‘structural features’, which
encompass ‘goal compatibility’, ‘power relation’, and ‘cultural status/sophistication’.
All three features determine the subject’s perception on the targeted actor whilst
considering whether the targeted actor possesses opportunity or threat, resulting in a
specific cognitive scheme or perception on image as the basis of the subject’s attitude
on the target. On the other hand, Hermann and Fischerkeller (1995) provided a more
elaborated explanation on each dimension. Both argued that the subject’s understanding
on possible threat and opportunity from the targeted actor becomes a central factor in
determining what they would view as the image of the target. Therefore, Hermann and
Fischerkeller’s thought resembles that of neorealists and neoliberalists, in which
perception on threat, exploitation, and cooperation opportunities are mainly affected by
materialistic considerations. In addition, understanding on threat perception is similar
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with the logic of relative gains, while understanding on exploitation opportunities is
similar with absolute gains on behalf of the targeted actor. Meanwhile, understanding on
cooperation opportunities implies existing possibility to reach absolute gain for both the
subject and targeted actors.
The second dimension, power relation, determines what options are possible as
an implication of certain strategies which the subject opts for. Perceiving the targeted
actor as a weaker counterpart will lead to direct actions. However, if the targeted actor
is deemed to possess similar amount of power, containment strategy will be the most
probable option. Lastly, if the targeted actor is seen as the stronger counterpart, adopting
some form of fortress protection or appeasement strategy will be the most likely option
to be taken. The next dimension is culture, in which Hermann and Fischerkeller (1995)
stated that consideration on the targeted actor’s culture and the norms it upholds is
needed. The subject’s perception on the targeted actor, in this case, is showcased by
how leaders of the subject utilizes verbal language. Scrutinizing the subject’s leader
statements will reflect what type of image best represents the subject’s view on the
targeted actor. Both Hermann and Fischerkeller explained their hypothesis on possible
strategies that the subject might adapt in response to its perception toward the targeted
actor, as described in Table 1.

Table 1. Hypotheses on Relations between Ideal Types of Image and Strategic Choices
Image

Strategy

Main goals of the chosen strategy

Enemy

Containment

Deterrence; protection and salvation; forming
alliance system; protecting global assets from
targeted actor; defending credibility as a major
power or benevolent ally.

Ally

Institutional

Strengthening cooperation to increase collective

cooperation

capability and trust; improving contribution from a
third party to pursue collective interest; minimizing
threats from a third party which disrupt targeted
actor’s capability;

lessening

the amounts

of

instruments of power and increasing resources
which contribute positively to both parties.
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Degenerate

Revisionism

Pursuing deterrence and pressure; creating a big
alliance system; protecting geopolitical assets and
attracting new allies.

Imperialist

Independent

Lessening targeted actor’s ability to control;

fortress

deterrence effect toward or defeating the targeted
actor; gaining support to attack the targeted actor;
minimizing the targeted actor’s role in the region
and limiting their access to resources.

Colony

Intervention

Ensuring the existence of cooperative regime to
maintain occupation on the targeted actor.

Sources: Hermann and Fischerkeller, 1995 in Özkeçeci, 2012

RESEARCH METHOD
In order to understand China’s perception toward Indonesia on South China Sea dispute,
this research will employ qualitative approach. Alan Bryman (2004) stated that
qualitative studies tend to put much emphasis on words in comparison to numbers, in
which the research is inductive, interpretive, and constructivist in character. This
research deems qualitative approach to be in line with the analytical framework which
has been put forward in the previous section. Verbal languages utilized by the leaders of
subjected actors will be considered to unravel the perception of the subjected actor on
the targeted actor.
Furthermore, Neuman (2014) explained that qualitative research uses secondary
data, such as photographs, words, sentences and symbols, which consequentially would
include how Chinese’ leaders make use of verbal languages to communicate their
perceptions on Indonesia. Such data will also be sourced from multiple journal articles
and online news articles, as well as official government websites. The focus of my data
gathering process will be set upon statements of Chinese leaders on Indonesia-China
relations within the context of South China Sea dispute. This research will explore
collections of data released in between the year of 1990 to 2019, as 1990 marked the
beginning of Indonesia’s initiative to commence informal workshop on conflict
management in South China Sea.
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DISCUSSION
In the last three decades, South China Sea has become a territorial dispute hotspot
between China, Taiwan, and four ASEAN member states, namely Vietnam, the
Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam. Their overlapping claims over South
China Sea can be traced back to World War II era. However, the claimant states made
their claims public in the 1960s (Agusman, 2017). China claimed all islands placed
within the South China Sea as theirs, as described by an official map depicting the ninedash line, which encompassed almost all parts of the sea. Beijing backed their claim
with a historical justification, arguing that the sea was a traditional fishing area. In this
case, China stated that they were the very first nation to find the islands in the South
China Sea, as the finding occurred when the Xia Dynasty was in power (Shen, 2002).
Meanwhile, Indonesia has repeatedly stood firm for its claim as a non-claimant
state. From the very beginning, Indonesia rejected China’s nine-dash line proposal,
which they deemed to be not in line with international maritime law under UNCLOS
(Oegroseno, 2014). However, Indonesia has constantly promoted peace, stability and
cooperation within the disputed area. True to the values they uphold, in 1990, Indonesia
initiated a workshop on conflict management in South China Sea (Djalal, 2001).
In addition to hosting such informal workshops commenced since 1990,
Indonesia is also actively promoting the importance of consolidating both ASEAN
member states and China’s views on proper conducts in South China Sea. Such
initiative lead to the success of reaching consensus on The Declaration of Conduct of
Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) between ASEAN and China in 2002, which
elaborated on standards of conduct for all signatories in order to maintain peace and
stability in the disputed areas, in which the spirit of cooperation and mutual confidence
stood at its basis (Kemlu, 2013). All signatories are also engaged in attempts to further
develop DoC, resulting in another success to reach collective consensus on the Code of
Conduct Framework in South China Sea in 2017 (Setnas ASEAN, 2017).
The framework, then, was further developed with ASEAN and China’s success
to reach agreement on the draft of Code of Conduct (CoC) in 2018 (Yong, 2018). The
draft, containing ethical standards of conduct in the disputed area, is set to be finished in
2021 (Setnas ASEAN, 2018). Responding to said progress, Wang Yi, China’s Minister
of Foreign Affairs, described such attempts in creating the CoC as a collective effort to
‘build a house together’. In his interview with Strait Times (Yong, 2018), Wang stated,
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It is like China and ASEAN countries building a house together. In the
past, there were 11 designs from the 11 countries on how this house would
look like. Now, we have laid in place good groundwork for a single design
of this house, and we have also put in place the fundamentals, like the
supporting pillars of this house.
Wang also spoke about his belief that without external interference, negotiation on CoC
will proceed smoothly in a short period of time.
Notwithstanding its diplomatic efforts with ASEAN on the South China Sea, the
last three decades have witnessed several incidents, causing rifts between Indonesia and
China on Beijing’s claim over nine-dash line, three of which occurred in 2016. Out of
those incidents, this study scrutinizes statements from Chinese officials as responses
toward clashes with and protests from the Indonesian side. In this case, China is
positioned as the subject actor, while Indonesia is positioned as the targeted actor.
As a response to China’s nine-dash line map, firstly distributed in the conflict
management workshop in 1993, Indonesia demanded clarification from the Chinese
side. Yet, at that moment, Chinese delegation told Indonesia to “interpret (the map) as
you wish” (Lumbanrau dan Kusumadewi, 2016). Only after two years did China put out
its clarification through a spokesperson from its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chen Jian.
Chen stated that China did not have any claim over the islands in Natuna, as well as
ensuring China’s willingness to engage in dialogues with Indonesia on maritime border.
Ali Alatas, Indonesia’s then Foreign Affairs Minister, responded by reaffirming that
Indonesia and China did not have any maritime border dispute and Indonesia did not
have any direct border with China, who is positioned far up the north (Johnson, 1997).
From then on, it took quite a while until another official statement from China to
Indonesia with regards to South China Sea dispute. Not even any statement was released
after Indonesia’s rejection of China’s note verbale to the United Nations which
reaffirmed its claim of the nine-dash line (The Permanent Mission of Republic of
Indonesia to UN, 2010).
Up until 2015, Chinese government remained with their stance on not having
any conflicting view with Indonesia’s sovereignty over the islands of Natuna. Such
statement was delivered by Chinese MoFA’s spokesperson, Hong Lei, as a response to
the Coordinating Minister of Maritime Affairs, Luhut Binsar Panjaitan, who spoke
about the possibility of Indonesia suing China to the International Court of Arbitration
over disputed claims in the waters of Natuna (Zhu, 2015). Hong also added that China
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was committed to a peaceful conflict resolution, whilst wishing to maintain IndonesiaChina strong, strategic partnership.
Later in 2016, amidst three incidents of illegal fishing involving Chinese vessels
which consequentially violated Indonesia’s territorial sovereignty over the waters of
Natuna, Chinese MoFA objected Indonesia’s responses and declared that its vessels
were operating within China’s traditional fishing area. In its press statement (China
Embassy, 2016), China maintained its ground on the absence of disputed claims
between Indonesia and China, while also adding a new narrative by stating that both
countries have overlapping maritime rights and interests in parts of South China Sea.
We have stated our position over the weekend on Indonesian navy vessels
harassing and shooting Chinese fishing boats and fishermen. This took
place in waters which are Chinese fishermen's traditional fishing grounds
and where China and Indonesia have overlapping claims for maritime
rights and interests. The Indonesian vessels that harassed and shot
Chinese fishing boats with a willful resort to force put the life and
property of Chinese fishermen in danger and violated international laws
including UNCLOS and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea (DOC). China strongly protests and condemns the abuse
of force. China urges the Indonesian side to stop taking actions that
complicate, exacerbate the dispute and undermine regional peace and
stability, and handle the fishery issue at sea in a constructive way. China
has no territorial sovereignty dispute with Indonesia. Yet the two countries
have overlapping claims for maritime rights and interests over some part
of the South China Sea. The two sides have normal communication
channels, and it is hoped that they will step up communication in a
friendly and constructive way and properly settle relevant issue.
A year after, Indonesia’s Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs released its
decision to name the waters at the northern side within the islands of Natuna, which
share direct border with the South China Sea, as the North Natuna Sea. The ministry’s
then First Deputy, Arif Havas Oegroseno, stated that the chosen name had been
commonly used among oil and gas corporations operating within the area (BBC
Indonesia, 2017). China responded with a demand to cancel the policy, as stated in its
protest note on August 25, 2017. Chinese MoFA explained that Indonesia’s decision
could potentially rise complexity and hostility in the South China Sea, which would
then affect attempts to ensure peace and stability. The note also noted that,
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The China-Indonesian relationship is developing in a healthy and stable
way, and the South China Sea dispute is progressing well…Indonesia’s
unilateral name-changing actions are not conducive to maintaining this
excellent situation.
Chinese MoFA also reaffirmed its belief of Indonesia and China’s overlapping
maritime claim in the southwestern part of the South China Sea, stating that the name
change would not change such fact (Ismail, 2017). In response to protest from Beijing,
Panjaitan, acting as Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister of Maritime Affairs, confirmed
that the changed name only applied to the area along Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) which did not reach any part of the South China Sea (Sheany, 2017). The
next section will discuss statements from the Chinese side, viewed from the three
dimensions of the image theory, which will showcase China’s perception on Indonesia.

Goal Compatibility
In accordance with Hermann and Fischerkeller’s conceptualization on image theory,
Chinese

government’s

official

statements

to

Indonesia

showcased

China’s

understanding of an existing goal compatibility with Indonesia. Such finding can be
inferred from a statement put out by Hong Lei as Chinese MoFA’s spokesperson,
confirming Beijing’s commitment to a peaceful conflict resolution and close bilateral
relations with Indonesia, due to their strategic partnership. China’s protest note on
Natuna’s changed name also showcased China’s perception of having a good relation
with Indonesia.
In addition, the Chinese side’s statements on illegal fishing and territorial border
violations in the waters of Natuna did not include any remark on nine-dash line. China
opted to naming its claim as “traditional fishing ground” in its responses to Indonesia in
such cases. It is fair to reckon that China attempted to avoid putting blames on
Indonesia in order to minimize risks of causing rifts among both countries, which would
potentially harm China’s security and economic interests. Such interests are related to
Chinese proposal of the 21st century’s Maritime Silk Road as a part of its Belt Road
Initiative (BRI) which would require close cooperation with Indonesia (Suryadinata,
2017). Furthermore, after the first clash occurred in 2016, Xi Jinping ordered the Head
of International Relations Committee of Chinese Communist Party to meet Joko
Widodo in Jakarta. After the meeting, Pramono Anung, then the Secretary of
Indonesia’s cabinet, released a press statement which clarified that the incidents in the
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waters of Natuna were merely cases of misunderstanding from the both sides and both
had agreed to deem the incidents as resolved (Suryadinata, 2016). Therefore, it is
concluded that China viewed Indonesia as having compatible goals, in which economic
interests stood at its basis.

Power Relations
By scrutinizing power relations dimension, it can be inferred from Hong Lei’s statement
as China’s MoFA spokesperson that China was committed to a peaceful conflict
resolution. With regards to incidents around the waters of Natuna in 2016,
notwithstanding the rather coercive actions from the Indonesian side, China did not give
any ultimatum nor threat to Indonesia. On the other hand, China urged Indonesia to take
a constructive approach in resolving illegal fishing cases. Therefore, it can be said that
China viewed Indonesia as an equal actor, power wise. Power’s definition, in this case,
is not limited to military power, as China is significantly stronger than Indonesia. Asia
Power Index (Lowy Institute, 2019), found that China’s current military capability
places Beijing at the second place after the U.S. in Asia, while Indonesia takes the 13 th
place.
State’s power is not solely determined by military capability, as it is also
important to consider other sources of power, such as geographical area, population
size, natural resources, economic power and social stability (Nye, 2004). By taking
those elements into account, Indonesia can also be considered as a strong power in the
Southeast Asia region in which the South China Sea is located at. According to
Indonesia’s Geospacial Information Body, Indonesia’s geographical area amounts to 8,3
million km2 in 2019 (Badan Informasi Geospasial, 2019). Then, according to World
Population Review (2019), Indonesia’s population reached 270 million which accounts
to 40% of the total population of ASEAN. In terms of its economic power, Indonesia is
a member of G20 forum, which encompasses 20 biggest economic powers. Among all
other G20 members, Indonesia’s economic growth ranked fourth under India, China,
and Turkey, placing them above the U.S. and EU (Katadata, 2018).
An equal economic power relation between Indonesia and China can also be
inferred from the improving trends in strategic partnership cooperation between the two
states, which was signed by Xi Jinping and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as Indonesia’s
then president in Jakarta, 2013 (MoFA of PRC, 2013). In his visit, Xi stated that China
perceived Indonesia as a priority in its international affairs with all other neighboring
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states. Xi also argued that China and Indonesia were two major developing countries
with significant influences in the region and the world as important emerging market
economies. According to his statement, Xi understood the development of international
and regional development at that time as an important imperative which made the
strategic partnership between both countries as an unavoidable alternative and an
important focus in the future. China was ready to have an in depth and comprehensive
cooperation with Indonesia in order to pursue mutual development which would benefit
the people of both countries, as well as to preserve welfare and stability in Asia and to
realize unity and cooperation among developing countries. In addition, China also
wished to support global development and peace agenda together with Indonnesia
(MoFA of PRC, 2013).
China’s Ambassador for Indonesia, Liu Jianchou, also stated in his interview
with People’s Daily (2013) that strategic partnership between Indonesia and China was
a manifestation of their close bilateral relationship. According to Liu, an improvement
from strategic partnership cooperation to comprehensive strategic partnership reflected
a long-lasting relationship between the two countries which was based on a strong
mutual trust. On the other hand, a former official of Indonesian MoFA disclosed that
Chinese MoFA needed a symbol which would represent its strengthening relations with
Indonesia, in which the partnership would serve as a symbol to both the people of China
and CCP that Indonesia should be considered as a friend (Priyandita, 2019).
Furthermore, Xi Jinping’s visit to Indonesia in 2013 was also highly reported by
mainstream media in China and Indonesia. China Daily reported that Indonesia’s central
position as Southeast Asia’s biggest power and China’s strong relationship with
Indonesia would facilitate China’s diplomatic strategy in the region, as Indonesia was
deemed to occupy a central position as the region’s leader. In this case, Indonesia was
regarded as a regional power with a strategic significance, not only in terms of
economic relations, but also in their political affairs (Lalisang, 2013).
Therefore, it is fair to conclude that China viewed Indonesia as an equal
counterpart, both in terms of its economic and political relations. Power relations with
Indonesia also went hand in hand with the existing compatibility in terms of both of
their goals.
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Cultural Dimension
The cultural dimension, comprising perception on norms in the targeted state, reflected
China’s perception in viewing Indonesia as an equal counterpart. Such view can be
inferred from statements by the Chinese government, saying that China and Indonesia
had multiple communication channels and wished that both countries would improve
their pursuance of constructive and friendly measures of conflict resolution. Indonesia
had, since 1990, commenced informal annual workshops on possibilities of conflict
management in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, China had become a participant of the
workshop since 1991. Therefore, in the span of its 28-year long interaction with
Indonesia, China had witnessed Indonesia’s capability in pioneering and facilitating
conflict management. In addition, as a founding member of ASEAN, Indonesia
occupied a significant position in ensuring regional stability in the region.
Furthermore, China’s understanding of its compatible position with Indonesia
with regards to the cultural dimension was related to the nuances of defense diplomacy
in Asia. According to David Capie (2013), defense diplomacy in Asia has three
characteristics: (1) tends to be informal and prioritize dialogue mechanism; (2)
preference form bilateral than multilateral cooperation; (3) discussion on security issues
tends to be swept under the rug and indirect.

CONCLUSION
This study argues that China tends to ascribe the image of an ‘ally’ to Indonesia. Such
tendency can be conferred from numerous statements from Chinese officials on several
incidents surrounding China’s claim on nine-dash line within Indonesia’s EEZ in the
waters of Natuna. Such conclusion is evident in three variables, namely goal
compatibility, power relations and cultural dimension. Indonesia is understood to have
similar features in all three variables to that of China, which lead to China’s strategy on
institutional cooperation toward Indonesia through capacity and confidence building
measures. In addition, this study also argues that image theory is able to answer
inquiries on China’s rather ambiguous attitude toward Indonesia on its nine-dash line
claim.
This study found that China’s perception, which views Indonesia as an ally,
emerged from its economic interest, which would lead to China’s strategy on
institutional cooperation, including its comprehensive strategic partnership in BRI. Both
countries have previously conducted trade arrangement under the mechanism of
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ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), which was enacted since January 1 of 2010
(ASEAN, 2015). Several Chinese government’s statements to Indonesa showcased
China’s perception of Indonesia which underlines Beijing’s understanding as Indonesia
as an important actor within the Southeast Asia region. Therefore, it is not in its best
interest to react recklessly on sensitive issues which might potentially lead to conflict
with Indonesia. In this case, China also understands Indonesia’s role in ASEAN and its
importance in maintaining regional stability.
Furthermore, this research argued that due to its image as an ally, Indonesia
should be able to maximize its bilateral cooperation with China, considering their
comprehensive strategic partnership. Despite Indonesian government’s claim on
China’s interest to invest in nine infrastructure projects under the framework of BRI
(CNN Indonesia, 2019), Indonesia still experienced deficit in its trade balance with
China (Indonesian Ministry of Trade, 2019). In the beginning of the 2000s decade,
Indonesia still experienced surplus in its trade balance with China, a trend which took
an opposite turn in 2008 (Booth, 2011). Then, Makmur Keliat, as quoted by Lalisang
(2013), stated that Indonesia’s export to China is dominated by energy and other natural
resources, while China exported manufactured commodities and capital goods. In this
case, several studies also noted that the existing inequality in the types of commodity
traded between China and ASEAN member states resemble a neocolonial trade policy
on the Chinese side, in which China was understood to be practicing colonialist trading
pattern with its Southeast Asian counterparts in order to fulfill its raw resource
commodities (Booth, 2011).
Therefore, it can be concluded that further studies on China’s perception on
Indonesia is needed to comprehend whether a shift in its perception on Indonesia’s
image has occurred within the context of the South China Sea dispute and any other
dimension of Indonesia-China bilateral relations.
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NOTES
1

G30/S PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, or the PKI) occurred around midnight of September 30 th until
early morning on October 1st, 1965. Six senior anti-communist army generals and one officer were killed
in this abortive coup. Major General Suharto (later became President Sukarno’s successor) launched an
effective counterattack on the next day. Before the incident, PKI had a close relation with President
Sukarno as it relied heavily upon Sukarno’s political support. It also had a close relation with the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) as well as Sukarno’s with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the early
1965, Beijing encouraged Sukarno to establish the Fifth Force, a militia group comprised armed peasants
and workers. It also initiated a military aid program in order to support the pro-Sukarno forces (the PKI
and air force) against the right-wing elements in the Indonesian army. Suharto regime accused Beijing
involved in this movement and launched a nation-wide anti-communist campaign. During 1965-1966, this
campaign cost 200.000-500.000 lives of those who were identified by their association with PKI. In
addition, during the anti-communist campaign, estimated 200.000 Chinese left Indonesia and returned to
China as a response to pressure put by Indonesian army. In October 1966, the bilateral relations were
officially suspended. See Zhou T., 2015; Cribb and Coppel, 2009; Cribb, 2004.
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